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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - BEVERLY HILLS COURTHOUSE

CHERYL AUGUSTINE,

Plaintiff,

v.

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, OAK
PRODUCTIONS, INC. and DOES 1 to 60,
inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 23SMCV05390

**PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE
NO. 6 TO MANAGE THE FORESEEABLE
CONSEQUENCES OF PLAINTIFF'S
PRETRIAL PUBLICITY; DECLARATION
OF ZARIF KAZI, ESQ.**

Assigned to: Hon. Edward B. Moreton, Jr
Dept. 205

Date: October 7, 2026
Time: 8:30 a.m.
Dept.: 205

Complaint Filed:
Trial Date: October 12, 2026

TO THE COURT AND TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

Plaintiff Cheryl Augustine (hereinafter, "Plaintiff") will and hereby does oppose Motion
in Limine No. 6 of Defendants Arnold Schwarzenegger and Oak Productions, Inc.

1 (hereinafter, collectively, "Defendants") to manage the foreseeable consequences of
2 Plaintiff's pretrial publicity.

3 Defendants' Motion should be denied for the following reasons:

- 4 1. Procedurally, Defendants' Motion has nothing to do with evidence; it concerns
5 issues of trial management. Accordingly, the submission of these requests in the
6 form of a motion in limine is inherently improper, and the motion may be denied
7 accordingly.
- 8 2. Substantively, Defendants' motion is a thinly veiled assault on the First
9 Amendment rights of the Plaintiff and her counsel. It asks the Court to impose
10 what amounts to a financial penalty on anyone who speaks about certain aspects
11 of the forthcoming trial. Such a ruling would chill protected speech or levy a "trial
12 tax" on the Plaintiff, forcing her to pay for extra security because of the Mr.
13 Schwarzenegger's celebrity status, as the price of exercising her constitutional
14 rights.
- 15 3. Defendants cite no statute or case that has ever authorized or empowered a trial
16 court to order the plaintiff and/or the plaintiff's counsel to pay for Defendants'
17 security demands merely because they have spoken about the upcoming trial.
- 18 4. There is nothing remotely confidential about the trial date set in this matter. The
19 trial date, time, and location are publicly available and easily accessible via the
20 case access link on the Los Angeles County Superior Court's website.
- 21 5. Defendants' act of filing their motion in limine No. 6 is an event so newsworthy
22 that it has resulted in the publication of a September 24, 2026, article in the Los
23 Angeles Times entitled "Lawyers seek extra security for Schwarzenegger after
24 opposing attorney's 'Terminator'-style post." In so doing, Defendants have likely
25 brought far more attention and publicity to the upcoming trial than any social
26 media postings made by Plaintiff's counsel.
- 27 6. Defendants' request for directed voir dire of social media postings regarding
28 litigants and their counsel is completely unnecessary. Voir dire into such areas is

1 already done routinely in trials of this nature. The court can address any concerns
2 over the content and scope of voir dire as it happens.

3 7. Similarly, admonishments to jurors to refrain from seeking information about
4 litigants and their counsel outside the courtroom are routinely given. There is no
5 need for any specific pre-trial order.

6 8. Civil trials are public events. The Court can and should enter camera and media
7 orders that respect the rights of the litigants and their counsel while
8 accommodating the public's right to know. There is no compelling reason,
9 however, for the Court to issue a blanket order forbidding cameras in or near the
10 courtroom merely because the Defendant is a celebrity.

11 This Opposition is based on the accompanying Memorandum of Points and
12 Authorities, the Declaration of Zarif Kazi in Support, the papers, records, and files in this
13 action, and such oral and documentary evidence as may be presented at the time of the
14 hearing.

15
16
17 DATED: September 28, 2026

DORDICK LAW CORPORATION

18 By:



19 John M. Upton, Esq.
20 Gary A. Dordick, Esq.
21 Taylor B. Dordick, Esq.
22 Zarif Kazi, Esq.
23 Attorneys for Plaintiff,
24 CHERYL AUGUSTINE
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants' Motion in Limine No. 6 is not about evidence. It is an attempt to exploit the financial disparity between the litigants, shift the security-related costs of Mr. Schwarzenegger's celebrity onto Ms. Augustine and her counsel for speaking about a public civil trial, and deflect attention from the substance of the underlying case.

The case itself is straightforward. Mr. Schwarzenegger drove a large SUV through a solid red light at a busy intersection near his home rather than wait for the signal to change. He was on his way to pick up his girlfriend at the airport. The resulting near-head-on collision knocked Ms. Augustine unconscious. Emergency physicians found bleeding on the brain. She was hospitalized and now lives with permanent cognitive impairment and frontal-lobe damage.

Ms. Augustine is a self-employed manicurist with modest means. Public reports place Mr. Schwarzenegger's net worth at \$1.1 billion. He is known to travel with a security detail. Nevertheless, Defendants ask the court to issue an order plainly designed to force Plaintiff to pay for the cost of any additional Sheriff's Department deemed necessary for trial should she or her team speak out about his anticipated appearance.

In so moving, Defendants also grossly overstate the reach and impact of Plaintiff's counsel's social media postings. Mr. Schwarzenegger maintains a personal Instagram account with 27 million followers, Instagram accounts associated with his Arnold Sports events have millions of followers, and his posts routinely attract millions of likes. The Instagram account of Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Dordick, in contrast, has a very modest social media following. The "I'll Be Back" post about a trial continuance (the post Defendants now complain of) drew far, far fewer "likes" than posts typically made by Mr. Schwarzenegger, and there is no evidence that it will result in scores of onlookers descending upon the Beverly Hills Courthouse to witness Mr. Schwarzenegger's appearance. Mr. Dordick's followers are mainly other lawyers and legal industry

1 professionals who watch and learn from the trials he presents. Of particular interest to
2 that group of followers in this case would be to see how Mr. Dordick conducts cross-
3 examination of high-profile witnesses in a case likely to attract public interest.

4 The suggestion that Mr. Dordick's posting could jeopardize Mr. Schwarzenegger's
5 safety or, more broadly, the public's safety at the courthouse borders on the absurd. A
6 public figure who drives in a negligent manner creates a public-safety risk, not a lawyer
7 posting about a witness schedule. Motion in Limine No. 6 appears designed to divert
8 attention away from Mr. Schwarzenegger's driving history and stifle the dissemination of
9 information about an upcoming trial that will address some of the very real
10 consequences of unsafe driving practices.

11 Civil trials are public events. Lawyers routinely identify the next day's witnesses as a
12 courtesy to the court and opposing counsel. Defendants cite no statute or case that has
13 ever authorized a court to order a plaintiff or her counsel to pay for a celebrity
14 defendant's extra security as the price of speaking about his or her anticipated
15 appearance at an upcoming trial. Indeed, as discussed in more detail below, an order
16 placing a financial burden on the exercise of First Amendment rights is presumptively
17 invalid.

18 On a related note, a request to allow cameras in the courtroom was filed on August
19 18, 2026, by David Siegel of Courtroom View Network ("CVN") and denied on August 18,
20 2026. In light of Defendants' professed concern that the trial will attract too many
21 spectators, Plaintiff urges the Court to reconsider that request. A single, discreetly
22 placed camera may well serve to reduce crowding at the courthouse, as those with an
23 interest in seeing events unfold may view them remotely on the camera's feed without
24 having to be personally present at the scene. In any event, Defendants certainly have
25 not shown any good cause for the Court to issue a blanket pretrial ban on photography,
26 video, or audio recording in the absence of any pending petition under California Rules
27 of Court, rule 1.150, based on little beyond Mr. Schwarzenegger's celebrity status.

28 //

1 The remainder of Defendants' motion seeks routine case-management directives that
2 have little to do with the admissibility of relevant evidence and are not proper subjects of
3 a motion in limine. The Plaintiff agrees that voir dire should explore jurors' social-media
4 habits and that the jury should be admonished against outside research. Such things are
5 routinely addressed in modern trials. No advance order is required for those ordinary
6 procedures.

7 Bottom line, Los Angeles courtrooms have hosted internationally known celebrities
8 before. This Court and the Sheriff's Department can manage the trial so as to protect
9 every litigant's rights and safety while preserving public access. They do not need this
10 motion in limine to do so. Rather than attack the Plaintiff and her counsel for keeping the
11 public informed, Defendants might be better served by focusing their attention on
12 resolving the case or further streamlining the trial.

13 14 **II. LEGAL ANALYSIS**

15 **A. Defendants' proposed cost-shifting order is an unconstitutional financial** 16 **burden on protected speech.**

17 **1. The Government may not charge a speaker for the anticipated reaction of** 18 **the audience.**

19 In *Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement* (1992) 505 U.S. 123, the United
20 States Supreme Court considered a county-enacted ordinance requiring a permit for
21 parades, assemblies, and similar uses of public property and authorizing the County
22 administrator to set a permit fee to cover administrative and law-enforcement costs for
23 "maintenance of public order," with the amount adjusted based on the anticipated
24 security needs and expected public response to the event. (*Id.* at 125-127, 134.) The
25 Supreme Court invalidated the ordinance because the permit fee turned on the
26 anticipated reaction of listeners to the speaker's message, rendering the scheme
27 content-based rather than content-neutral. (*Id.* at p. 134 ["Listeners' reaction to speech is
28 not a content neutral basis for regulation."].) The Court further rejected the premise that

1 a speaker may be made to pay for the security his audience necessitates, stating
2 “speech cannot be financially burdened, any more than it can be punished or banned,
3 simply because it might offend a hostile mob.” (*Id.* at pp. 134-135.)

4 Defendants’ proposed order mandating that Plaintiff be ordered to pay for the costs
5 of sheriffs at the courthouse is directly at odds with *Forsyth County*. The charge is
6 blatantly and admittedly based on Plaintiff’s counsel’s speech as Defendants seek to
7 impose it on “the party whose publicity created the need.” (Defendants’ Notice of Motion
8 at p.2, lines 19-23.) It would be measured by the security the Sheriff believes the
9 audience requires (Motion at p.10, lines 14-25) and it rests on the theory that the
10 audience may include people with “ill intent.” (*Id.* at p. 9, lines 6-7.)

11 **2. The proposed order is a content-based financial penalty, and reciprocity**
12 **does not cure it.**

13 The Supreme Court has long held that the government may not levy a charge on the
14 exercise of a constitutional right (*Murdock v. Com. of Pennsylvania* (1943) 319 U.S. 105,
15 113), and that a rule imposing a financial burden on speakers because of their speech is
16 presumptively invalid. (*Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime*
17 *Victims Bd.* (1991) 502 U.S. 105, 115.) The order Defendants propose applies only to a
18 party who “publicly promotes this trial or the attendance of any witness.” (Notice at p.2,
19 lines 24-26.) Assuming for purposes of argument that this is a standard that could ever
20 be implemented in practice, it is certainly defined by the subject of the speech.

21 Defendants’ offer to make it “reciprocal” does not change that.

22 **3. Defendants should not be able to obtain by monetary consequence what**
23 **they concede they cannot obtain by a prior restraint.**

24 Defendants’ insistence that the order “would not penalize speech” and is not a
25 restraint because counsel “remains free to leave the post up and publish again” does not
26 address the fundamental problem that the exercise of this right would result in a financial
27 consequence. A speaker who must choose between speaking and facing an unknown
28 monetary liability or remaining silent with no corresponding financial consequence is not

1 free in any meaningful sense. Defendants conceded that they cannot, and will not try, to
2 meet the stringent standard for restraining a trial participant's speech under *Steiner v.*
3 *Superior Court* (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1479 and *Hurvitz v. Hoefflin* (2000) 84
4 Cal.App.4th 1232. (Motion at p.4, lines 7-12.) As such, the Court should not permit
5 Defendants to achieve the same deterrent result by attaching a price to the exercise of
6 free speech.

7 **B. No statute or rule authorizes the Court to charge a litigant for public court**
8 **security.**

9 Court security is a public function. The sheriff provides it under the Superior Court
10 Security Act. (Gov. Code § 69920 et seq.) Defendants concede as much. (Motion at p. 9,
11 lines 19–21, citing Gov. Code §§ 69921.5, 69922.) The sheriff is responsible for the
12 necessary level of court security services. (Gov. Code § 69921.5.) Those services
13 include attending court, patrolling hallways, screening, and enhanced security for judicial
14 officers and court personnel. (Gov. Code § 69922(b).) In a civil case, sheriff attendance
15 is a public-safety determination for the presiding judge or designee, not a private benefit
16 a party may purchase or force another litigant to fund. (Gov. Code § 69922(a).)

17 Nothing in that Act authorizes this Court to require a litigant to reimburse the County
18 or the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department for deputies, or to post a deposit against
19 the cost of courthouse security. Defendants cite no statute, rule, or case in which any
20 California court has imposed such a charge. Plaintiff's research has disclosed none.

21 Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivisions (a)(3) and (a)(5), empower the
22 Court to provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings and to control persons connected
23 with them. Those incidental powers do not include the right to impose what would
24 amount to a "trial tax" associated with access to the courthouse. These provisions do not
25 authorize a court to make an order requiring one party or another to reimburse the Court
26 or the Sheriff for the cost of an "enhanced presence" during trial. Defendants offer no
27 authority applying section 128 in this way. Inherent power to keep does not empower a
28 court to shift a public safety cost onto a private litigant simply because the opposing

1 party is a celebrity or otherwise.

2 Indeed, this is not the first time that a well-known celebrity will be appearing in a Los
3 Angeles County courtroom. The Court and the Sheriff's department are well equipped to
4 address the logistics of such a circumstance, but there is no statute or rule empowering
5 the Court to shift the cost of any such measures onto a litigant.

6 **C. Defendants have not established good case for a blanket order prohibiting**
7 **photography, video, or audio recording of any participant in Department 205 or its**
8 **adjacent corridors.**

9 The proposed protocol is unnecessary, overbroad, and inverted. Rule 1.150 already
10 governs photographing, recording, and broadcasting. It requires a written order for
11 media coverage of court proceedings, gives the Court discretion to permit, refuse, limit,
12 or terminate coverage after considering specified factors, and already forbids coverage
13 of jurors, spectators, jury selection, chambers conferences, and attorney-client or bench
14 conferences. The rule also states that it "does not otherwise limit or restrict the right of
15 the media to cover and report court proceedings." CRC 1.150(e). A standing
16 "management and security protocol" that announces a blanket ban on photography,
17 video, or audio of "any participant" in Department 205 or adjacent corridors, unless a
18 prior written order is obtained, adds nothing lawful.

19 Civil trials are presumptively open. Openness exists so that people who cannot sit in
20 the courtroom can still have confidence that the process is fair. (*Press-Enterprise Co. v.*
21 *Superior Court* (1986) 478 U.S. 1, 13; *Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia* (1980) 448
22 U.S. 555, 572–73. Celebrity status of a litigant does not reverse that presumption. If
23 anything, public interest in how the courts treat a famous litigant makes access more, not
24 less, important. Accordingly, the court should not issue a blanket prohibition before
25 entertaining any petitions that might be submitted by news outlets, organizations, and/or
26 other members of the public permitting such coverage.

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1 **D. Defendants have not established any good cause for a special voir dire**
2 **targeting order.**

3 After the Court conducts its initial examination of the venire, “counsel for each party
4 shall have the right to examine, by oral and direct questioning, any of the prospective
5 jurors.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 222.5(b)(1). Social media engagement with a party or a
6 party’s counsel is, at its core, a form of acquaintance, knowledge of the case, or potential
7 source of bias. Those topics are already standard in voir dire questionnaires and/or
8 questions by the trial court judge (biographical information, acquaintance with parties or
9 counsel, knowledge of the case, etc.). Questions about social media engagement fall
10 within the ordinary scope of examination. No pre-approval or special order is needed for
11 either counsel to inquire on this subject.

12 Indeed, voir dire exists so the parties may select a fair and impartial jury and so their
13 counsel may make an intelligent exercise of challenges for cause and peremptory
14 challenges. (Code Civ. Proc. § 222.5; California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1540(b).) The
15 examination must be “liberal and probing” so counsel can discover bias and prejudice
16 under the circumstances of the particular case. The court may impose only reasonable
17 limits; it may not restrict that right. (*Bly-Magee v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp.* (1994) 24
18 Cal.App.4th 318, 324.) A prospective juror who has liked, followed, commented on,
19 messaged, or otherwise engaged with a litigant or counsel on social media may harbor
20 undisclosed familiarity, sympathy, hostility, or preconceptions. Inquiring about that
21 engagement is a direct, non-argumentative way to uncover facts relevant to impartiality.
22 It can and should be liberally probed. No special order is needed for such inquiries, and
23 the Court may address any issues regarding scope or subject matter during the voir dire
24 tailored to a specific situation process rather than issuing some sort of overarching
25 directive.

26 **E. Defendants have not established any good cause for a special admonishment**
27 **order.**

28 CACI No. 100 (Preliminary Admonitions), given at the start of trial, already covers the

1 substance of what jurors must do during recesses and other separations: do not discuss
2 the case (including with other jurors), do not use electronic or social media to
3 communicate or research, avoid contact with parties/counsel/witnesses, do not form or
4 express an opinion until the case is submitted, and report any outside contact.
5 Defendants' request for a similar admonishment would be redundant.

6 Plaintiff has no objection to the Court admonishing the juror with this instruction in
7 CACI 100 as often as it sees fit.

8 **F. Defendants' request that the Court consult the Los Angeles County Sheriffs**
9 **regarding safety management has nothing to do with evidence.**

10 Plaintiff does not dispute the Court's inherent authority to control the litigation before
11 it and to adopt any suitable method of practice to protect the integrity of the proceedings.
12 (*Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967.)

13 Plaintiff's position is that this request has nothing to do with evidence, which is the
14 purpose of a motion in limine. A motion in limine is a motion at the threshold of trial to
15 exclude evidence deemed inadmissible and prejudicial by the moving party. (*People v.*
16 *Morris* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 188.) Its purpose is to "avoid the obviously futile attempt to
17 'unring the bell'" when highly prejudicial evidence is offered and then stricken at trial. (*Id.*)
18 Matters of day-to-day trial logistics and common professional courtesy are not proper
19 subjects of a motion in limine. (*Kelly v. New West Fed. Sav.* (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 659,
20 671). This is a matter for a chambers discussion or perhaps a trial brief. The request
21 does not request a ruling on an evidentiary issue, and requests that the Los Angeles
22 County Sheriff's department (which is not a party to this action and has not been served
23 with this Motion) make certain assessments and take certain measures in light of Mr.
24 Schwarzenegger's anticipated appearance at trial.

25 //

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1 **III. CONCLUSION**

2 For all the above reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court deny
3 Defendants' Motion in Limine No. 6

4
5 Respectfully Submitted,

6 DORDICK LAW CORPORATION

7 DATED: September 28, 2026

8 By: 
9 John M. Upton, Esq.
10 Gary A. Dordick, Esq.
11 Taylor B. Dordick, Esq.
12 Zarif Kazi, Esq.
13 Attorneys for Plaintiff,
14 CHERYL AUGUSTINE
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I, Zarif Kazi, declare and state as follows:

1. I am an attorney licensed to practice before all the courts of the State of California. I am employed by Dordick Law Corporation, attorneys for Plaintiff Cheryl Augustine.. I am over the age of eighteen and have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein, and, if called as a witness, I could and would testify competently as to such facts.

2. This declaration is made in support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion in Limine No. 6 of Defendants Arnold Schwarzenegger and Oak Productions, Inc. (hereinafter "Defendants") to manage the foreseeable consequences of Plaintiff's pretrial publicity.

3. Attached as Exhibit 1 to this Declaration is a true and correct copy of the article appearing September 24, 2026, on the Los Angeles Times' website at <https://www.latimes.com/entertainment-arts/story/2026-09-24/arnold-schwarzenegger-seeks-amped-up-security-after-unusual-post>. I accessed it on September 24, 2026.

4. I follow Mr. Dordick's Instagram account (dordicklawcorp), which has approximately 18,200 followers. Most of his followers are believed to be other attorneys and legal professionals. The "I'll Be Back" post about a trial continuance (the post Defendants now complain of) drew approximately 220 "likes."

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 28th day of September 2026 at Beverly Hills, California.


Zarif Kazi

Exhibit “1”

ENTERTAINMENT & ARTS

Lawyers seek extra security for Schwarzenegger after opposing attorney's 'Terminator'-style post



Arnold Schwarzenegger is headed to court again, but seeks extra security after an attorney's "Terminator"-themed post sparks concern. (Noam Galai / Getty Images for SiriusXM)



By Emily St. Martin
Staff Writer | [@ Follow](#)

Sept. 24, 2026 10 PM PT



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Attorneys for [Arnold Schwarzenegger](#) have asked a Los Angeles judge for amped-up security at a forthcoming court date in which the former actor and politician is expected to testify.

The trial is set to determine the payout for Cheryl Augustine, who was involved in a 2022 four-vehicle traffic crash in which she claims Schwarzenegger's reckless driving caused her significant, life-altering injuries. Earlier this month, Augustine's lawyer Gary A. Dordick posted a mock-movie advertisement that included a description and photo of the 2022 incident as well as the time, date and location of the upcoming

court date. The post also featured [Dordick dressed like the Terminator](#), with the signature shades and leather jacket.

Now attorneys for the former action hero, 79, are requesting that court officials and law enforcement set up security protocols; disallow photography, video or audio recording; and tighten up who's allowed in the courtroom.

The legal filing, obtained by The Times, argues that Dordick's post "tells any one of Instagram's three billion active users the date, time, street address, department number, and expected duration of Arnold Schwarzenegger's attendance at trial in a public courthouse."

The filing acknowledges that the information is already publicly available but argues that the post "goes further, through a ubiquitous medium that does not call for a citizen to navigate the Los Angeles County Superior Court's website."

"Indeed, the post identifies Governor Schwarzenegger as the first witness," the filing reads. "Whatever else may be said about the post, it is an advertisement for the appearance of one of the most recognizable people in the world at a fixed place and time, published five weeks in advance, by a person who has no responsibility for what happens when the audience shows up."

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In Augustine's Beverly Hills Superior Court lawsuit, she claims that Schwarzenegger was negligent when his SUV sped through a left turn at the intersection of Sunset Boulevard and Allenford Avenue, and struck her Toyota Prius, along with a Porsche and another Toyota. At the time, [Los Angeles police said](#) that paramedics transported a woman who suffered a head abrasion to the hospital.

Schwarzenegger has admitted he was negligent but disputes the amount of damages Augustine is requesting. That total wasn't immediately clear, but when the suit was filed in 2023, she [reportedly was suing for](#) damages as well as all medical and incidental expenses.

In 2023, the former governor and his GMC Yukon were the subject of another accident-turned-lawsuit. Joanne Flickinger sued Schwarzenegger for negligent

driving, which she claimed led to the biking accident that landed her with hefty medical bills.

The suit, [reviewed by The Times](#), states that on Feb. 5, 2023, Schwarzenegger was driving “with excessive speed and failed to keep a proper lookout” on San Vicente Boulevard when his vehicle struck Flickinger, “causing severe injuries.” The suit further alleges that Flickinger’s injuries are “permanent.”

More to Read

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Nov. 29, 2024



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Feb. 27, 2024



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Emily St. Martin

Emily St. Martin is an entertainment reporter on the Fast Break Desk and writes for the Books desk as well. Before joining the Los Angeles Times, she contributed to the New York Times, InStyle, Cosmopolitan, BBC, Vice and Los Angeles Magazine. She also previously worked at the Hollywood Reporter, and served as the digital features editor at Southern California News Group. In 2025, she won first place for best editorial with the L.A. Press Club.

PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
) ss.
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)

I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my business address is: 1122 WILSHIRE BLVD., LOS ANGELES, CA 90017.

On September 28, 2026, I served the foregoing documents described as **PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 6 TO MANAGE THE FORESEEABLE CONSEQUENCES OF PLAINTIFF'S PRETRIAL PUBLICITY; DECLARATION OF ZARIF KAZI, ESQ.** on all parties as follows:

[SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST]

() **BY UNITED STATES MAIL.** I enclosed the documents in a sealed envelope or package addressed to the persons at the addresses listed below and

() deposited the sealed envelope with the United States Postal Service with postage fully prepaid.

() placed the envelope for collection and mailing, following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with this business's practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid.

I am employed in the county where the mailing occurred. The envelope or package was placed in the mail at Los Angeles, California.

() **BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY.** I enclosed the documents in an envelope or package provided by an overnight delivery carrier and addressed to the persons listed in the attached service list. I placed the envelope or package for collection and overnight delivery at an office or a regularly utilized drop box of the overnight delivery carrier.

() **BY MESSENGER SERVICE.** I placed the documents in an envelope or package addressed to the persons at the addresses listed in the attached service list and providing them to a messenger service for service.

1 () **BY PERSONAL SERVICE.** I caused such documents to be delivered
2 personally delivered to the persons addresses listed below.

3 () For a party represented by an attorney, delivery was made to the
4 attorney or at the attorney's office by leaving the documents, in an
5 envelope or package clearly labeled to identify the attorney being
6 served, with a receptionist or an individual in charge of the office,
7 between normal business hours.

8 () For a party, delivery was made to the party or by leaving the
9 documents at the party's residence with some person not younger
10 than 18 years of age between normal business hours.

11 () **BY FAX TRANSMISSION.** I caused all of the pages of the above-
12 entitled document to be sent to the recipients noted on the attached
13 service list via electronic transfer (FAX) at the respective FAX numbers
14 pursuant to C.C.P. §1013(e) from DORDICK LAW CORPORATION on the
15 date set forth above. The machine I used complied with California Rules
16 of Court, Rule 2.306(h)(3) and no error was reported by the machine.

17 (X) **BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE [E-MAIL]** Based on a court order or an
18 agreement of the parties to accept service by e-mail or electronic
19 transmission, I caused the document(s) to be sent from e-mail address
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25 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
26 above is true and correct.

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**Augustine v. Schwarzenegger, et al.
Case No. 23SMCV05390**

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